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ABSTRACT 
 
This study develops a research model to investigate whether firms that restate previously released 
financial reports implement subsequent changes in internal governance in an effort to correct 
underlying problems that contributed to the need for restatement in the first place. In doing so, 
various likely responses to financial reporting problems, including board, audit, and management 
changes, are indexed into a single measure to assess the joint strength of multiple corporate 
governance attributes within a firm. The paper demonstrates how a comparison of the Index 
before and after a restatement may be used to relate the nature and magnitude of a restatement 
with the likelihood of corporate governance changes in the aftermath of restatement. Further, the 
paper classifies sample restatements more finely on the basis of presence of fraud, prompter, 
magnitude, severity, and reason for the restatement. This more detailed classification recognizes 
that responses to restatements likely relate to particular characteristics of the restatement and the 
restatement firm. To illustrate the use of the Index in the research model, a sample hypothesis is 
examined, with findings showing a statistically significant association between restatements 
involving fraud and subsequent corporate governance changes.  
 
Keywords:  Restatements; Corporate Governance; Turnover; Fraud    
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
mpirical studies report that key corporate governance features, such as outside board members, separate 
CEO and Chairman of the Board positions, an independent audit committee, the use of a Big Four 
auditor, and a small board size, can be useful in reducing financial misreporting (e.g., Beasley, 1996; 
Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1996; Abbott, Parker, and Peters, 2004; Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Farber, 2005; 
Baber, Kang, Liang, and Zhu, 2009). In these studies, both restatement and SEC-targeted fraud firms are associated 
with weaknesses in their internal corporate governance mechanisms.
1
 This relation between corporate governance 
quality and financial reporting credibility has been one driving force behind the euphoria surrounding corporate 
governance regulation in recent years. In particular, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 enhanced regulatory standards 
for all U.S. public company boards and management by requiring the certification of financial reports by top 
managers and by establishing harsh criminal penalties for altering or falsifying records.
2
 
 
The heightened interest in the governance of U.S. firms has resulted in part from a restatement trend in 
recent years (Abbott et al., 2004). According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO, hereafter), the 
number of financial statement restatements steadily rose from 92 in 1997 to 370 in 2004.
3, 4
 In addition, 
consequences to restatement firms have been severe, typically resulting in large losses in market value following 
announcements of restatements, which are sometimes accompanied by legal actions by investors and/or the 
                                                 
1 Baber et al. (2009) find that it is weak external governance mechanisms rather than internal governance mechanisms that relate 
to the occurrence of restatements. 
2 Sections 302 and 802, respectively. 
3 There was a slight drop in number of firms restating between 2002 and 2003 (GAO, 2006). 
4 In a follow-up study by the GAO, the number of restatements showed little sign of abating, climbing to 523 in the January 2005 
through September 2005 period (GAO, 2006).  
E 
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, hereafter) (e.g., GAO, 2002; Wu, 2002; Palmrose, Richardson, and 
Scholz, 2004; Palmrose and Scholz, 2004).
5
 Other studies document increases in the cost of equity capital following 
restatements, making it more costly for these firms to acquire future financing (Hribar and Jenkins, 2004; Anderson 
and Yohn, 2002) and decreases in the earnings response coefficient, reducing the information content of earnings 
(Wu, 2002; Wilson, 2008). In sum, financial statement restatements appear to be important and significant economic 
events for exchange-traded firms in the United States.  
 
 The purpose of this paper is to develop a method to investigate whether firms that restate previously 
released financial reports implement subsequent changes in internal governance in an effort to correct underlying 
problems that contributed to the need for restatement in the first place. In doing so, various likely responses to 
financial reporting problems, including board, audit, and management changes, are indexed into a single measure. 
Prior studies have examined selective aspects of changes to corporate governance in the period following a 
restatement, including the turnover of senior management and board members (e.g., Desai, Hogan, and Wilkins, 
2006; Srinivasan, 2005) and the reduction in both bonus payments (Collins, Reitenga, and Sanchez-Cuevas, 2008) 
and the proportion of option-based compensation (Cheng and Farber, 2008) for CEOs. This study goes beyond prior 
literature on the topic by further examining the link between restatements and internal corporate governance 
changes. In doing so, a broad measure of corporate governance that encapsulates board, audit, and management 
elements is created in an effort to assess the joint strength of multiple corporate governance attributes within a firm.  
 
While it would appear reasonable to think that all firms would prefer to correct problems that prompted 
restatements, a reform in corporate governance does not necessarily follow restatements. It is possible that 
entrenched and/or overconfident managers may not fully recognize the need to implement nor the value of 
implementing governance changes and thus choose not to undertake improvements. Further, in technical 
restatements, such as those that arise in response to guidance by the SEC or the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB, hereafter), governance changes are, perhaps, less necessary and therefore less likely. Prior studies do 
not control for all the variation in the characteristics of restatements. For example, Desai et al. (2006) do not 
differentiate restatements by their relative effects on firms’ financial statements or by the stated reason for the 
restatement. It is likely, though, that responses by firms following restatements might vary according to the severity 
and reason for the restatement. 
 
This paper makes two chief contributions to the literature. First, the study classifies GAO restatements 
more finely on the basis of presence of fraud, prompter, magnitude, severity, and reason for the restatement. This 
classification recognizes that responses to restatements likely relate to particular characteristics of the restatement as 
well as to individual firm characteristics that were present in prompting the need for restatement. Second, the paper 
develops a research model designed to relate the nature of a restatement with the likelihood of corporate governance 
changes and to identify those features that are most strongly associated with governance changes.  
 
 The following section outlines the theory and research methodology. Section 3 develops a regression 
model, Section 4 describes the sample selection process and the sample firms, and Section 5 explains the method 
used to construct the governance index and the dependent variable. Empirical results for a sample hypothesis are 
reported in Section 6, and Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  THEORY AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Much of the restatement literature parallels a more developed body of literature concerning financial 
statement frauds. However, while fraudulent activity could result in the need for restatement, restatements do not 
necessarily involve fraud and thus represent a broader group of firms. Moreover, firm and governance characteristics 
in the two settings might be quite different, resulting in different causes for as well as responses to the respective 
financial reporting problems. Specifically, financial statement fraud often stems from poor managerial oversight, 
spiraling from weak internal control systems. Because internal controls are ineffective, management turnover and 
                                                 
5 Palmrose et al. (2004) report a significant average abnormal return of -9.2% over a 2-day announcement window. Similarly, the 
GAO Report finds that stock prices of restating companies over the 1997 to 2001 period fell 9.5% on average, over a 3-day 
announcement window. 
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other changes in governance are likely to follow fraud detection as a means to curb fraudulent behavior and 
strengthen the internal control system.
6
  
 
In contrast to this, many restatements do not arise due to poor managerial oversight and outright fraudulent 
activities. Rather, it is often overconfident and, possibly, entrenched managers who engage in overly aggressive 
accounting methods that leads to the need for restatement.
7
 For example, managers have discretion in obtaining 
estimates relating to bad debt allowances, accruals, impairment of assets, recognition of gains and losses, and 
various timing issues, among others. Although they are not inherently fraudulent, consistently aggressive estimates 
may result in the need for restatements. It is possible that entrenched and/or overconfident managers may not fully 
recognize the value in implementing governance changes and thus choose not to undertake improvements. In 
overestimating their own abilities to benefit the company, they may actually make distorted decisions, resulting in 
the eventual need for restatements, with their associated losses in value to the firm. 
 
In addition, restatements are sometimes merely technical adjustments for compliance or represent 
companies strengthening their internal controls. In particular, the certification of financial reports required by 
Section 302 and the internal controls provisions of Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 prompted 
restatements. 
 
Consequently, while corporate governance changes are expected to follow restatements involving outright 
fraud, the reaction by firms to various non-fraudulent restatements and to other relatively technical restatements is 
unclear and remains an empirical issue. Considering the substantial costs associated with financial statement 
restatements, firms would likely seek to correct underlying problems that potentially contributed to the need for 
restatement. In this context, restatements might be expected to spur improvements in corporate governance 
arrangements. On the other hand, perhaps entrenched and/or overconfident managers do not initiate governance 
changes. Also, in other types of more technical restatements, governance changes are, perhaps, less necessary and 
therefore less likely. In general, the expectation is that governance responses to restatements likely relate to 
particular characteristics of the restatement as well as to individual firm characteristics that were present in 
prompting the need for restatement.  
 
 To assess a firm’s overall corporate governance and any changes following a restatement, this paper 
develops a composite score computed using an array of governance features that may be adjusted in light of a 
financial statement restatement. This idea is similar to the “Governance Index” (G-Index), a composite measure of 
the strength in shareholder rights developed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). However, the index in this study 
differs from the G-Index, as the primary focus is on board strength as well as audit and management elements. A 
single score, comprising board, audit, and management features, is intended to give a more accurate portrayal of the 
joint strength of multiple governance attributes within a firm. A composite score is calculated in the year preceding a 
restatement announcement and then again two years following the restatement. The composite score provides a 
useful research tool, whereby any change in the composite score may be examined to find determinants of that 
change. 
 
 As with the G-Index, the composite score (Index, hereafter) may not accurately reflect the relative impact 
of different governance components. However, it has the advantage of being transparent, objective, and easily 
reproducible. Furthermore, as with the G-Index, the Index is a more efficient tool than pooling all the variables. 
Although certain corporate governance components might be expected to play a stronger role than others, substantial 
multicollinearity between the components would make it difficult to construct powerful tests.
8
 Consequently, the 
Index enhances the power of any tests that might be performed.
9
 Moreover, the Index provides a convenient method 
                                                 
6 Findings by Feroz et al. (1991), Livingston (1997), and Farber (2005) support this expectation. 
7 This is based on the growing behavioral corporate finance literature that examines overtly confident CEOs who overestimate 
their ability to generate value within their company and thus systematically make distorted decisions about when, how, and how 
much to invest in new projects [see Malmendier and Tate (2005a, 2005b, 2008, 2009)].  
8 Gompers et al. (2003) find that there is lack of power in subindex regressions and that the relative importance of individual 
governance provisions cannot be measured exactly because of large standard errors that are partly due to multicollinearity 
between regressors. 
9 This refers to statistical tests where the Index is an independent variable (right-hand side). 
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to compare changes to firms’ corporate governance levels over time and to examine the determinants of those 
changes.
10
 
 
The following sections describe the construction of the Index. Specifically, board, audit, and management 
characteristics are discussed in terms of findings documented in previous studies, and the Index is constructed in 
accordance with attributes shown in prior literature to be associated with “good” corporate governance. 
 
Board Features 
 
Numerous academic studies analyze the link between board composition and overall firm performance 
(Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Yermack, 1996; Klein, 
1998; Bhagat and Black, 1999). Although results are mixed, there is no compelling evidence that firms with 
majority-independent boards perform better than firms without such boards (Bhagat and Black, 1999). However, 
greater board independence appears to improve key decisions made by management with respect to responding to 
takeovers, setting executive compensation, and approving new CEOs (e.g., Weisbach, 1988; Cotter, Shivdasani, and 
Zenner, 1997; Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999). 
 
Weisbach (1988) finds that more independent boards are more effective in their discipline of management, 
as indicated by a higher likelihood of CEO turnover following poor performance in firms with boards dominated by 
outsiders. Dahya, McConnell, and Travlos (2002) report similar results for a sample of U.K. firms. Moreover, recent 
public policy debate advocates independence of not only the full board, but also key oversight committees.
11
 
 
Beyond independence, several other board characteristics have been discussed in prior literature. For 
instance, concerns about a lack of independent leadership are expressed in Jensen (1993), where he suggests that 
when the CEO also holds the position of Chairman of the Board, internal control systems seem to fail. Among the 
board’s primary jobs is its responsibility to evaluate (and fire) the CEO. In boards where the CEO presides as 
chairman, it is possible that this job cannot be carried out effectively. Goyal and Park (2002) similarly find that CEO 
turnover is significantly less sensitive to firm performance in firms with combined titles than in firms with separate 
titles.
12
 
 
Yermack (1996) shows a positive association between a small board size and corporate valuation in large 
U.S. firms. In addition, other studies show negative effects when directors are involved in serving on other 
companies’ boards (Core et al., 1999; Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999).  Finally, interlocked directorships are found 
to have negative effects as well, especially in their association with higher CEO compensation and lower CEO 
turnover (Hallock, 1997; Core et al., 1999; Fich and White, 2003).  
 
Given that some board attributes shown in prior literature are associated with “good” corporate governance, 
the Index increases by one if: (1) more than two-thirds of the board is comprised of independent directors; (2) all 
audit committee members are independent directors; (3) all compensation committee members are independent 
directors; (4) all nominating committee members are independent directors; (5) all corporate governance committee 
members are independent directors; (6) the titles of CEO and Chairman of the Board are not held by one individual; 
(7) the Chairman of the Board is an independent outside director; (8) the board size is less than the median of the 
distribution of all firms (adjusted for firm size and time); (9) the board interlock is less than the median of all firms 
(adjusted for firm size and time); or (10) the mean number of other boards served by a director is less than the 
median of the distribution of means of all firms (adjusted for firm size and time). These ten attributes are used to 
measure the strength of a board. 
                                                 
10 In this case, changes to the Index would function as the dependent variable (left-hand side).  
11 The Sarabanes-Oxley Act of 2002 required that publicly-traded firms have audit committees composed solely of independent 
directors. Similarly, as of November 2003, companies listed on the NYSE are required to establish audit, nominating/corporate 
governance, and compensation committees composed entirely of independent directors, and companies with securities quoted on 
NASDAQ are required to have audit committees composed entirely of independent directors.  
12 In opposing this view, Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell (1997) suggest that the costs of separation may be larger than the benefits 
for most large firms. 
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Audit Features 
 
 The consensus in prior studies that examine the value of audit firms is that Big Four audit firms provide 
better monitoring than other types of audit firms. For example, DeAngelo (1981) finds that larger audit firms 
provide a higher level of audit quality. Larger firms are more susceptible to negative consequences resulting from 
failure to perform satisfactorily and thus have less incentive to engage in opportunistic practices. Larger audit firms 
are also thought to face less litigation than other firms, because they provide higher quality audits (e.g., Palmrose, 
1988). In view of this association, the Index increases by one if the firm employs a Big Six audit firm.
13
 
Furthermore, the Index considers potential audit-firm changes (of any type) following a restatement. The Index 
increases by one in the post-restatement period (defined as two years following the restatement announcement) if 
there is a change in the external auditor since the pre-restatement period (defined as the year preceding the 
restatement announcement). 
 
Management Features 
 
The significant inverse relation between firm performance and the probability of top management turnover 
is a finding that has been widely documented throughout the accounting and finance literatures.
14
 Specifically, 
turnover is found to increase when firm performance deteriorates. This is most often the result of successful 
monitoring by boards of directors, other competing managers, large shareholders, and the threat created by the 
takeover market. Given a negative relation between corporate performance and top management turnover, it follows 
that the announcement of a restatement, with its associated decline in stock market performance, might result in a 
change in management. If internal monitoring mechanisms are effective, and if stock price performance reflects 
information on managers’ efficiency, there should be a negative relation between the probability of a top 
management change and share price performance (Warner, Watts, and Wruck, 1998). Thus, top managers are 
expected to be held responsible for the occurrence of a restatement and its related stock market consequences.   
 
 To incorporate management changes into the study, the Index is adjusted according to the level of CEO 
turnover. If a restatement firm experiences a change in CEO between the pre-restatement and post-restatement 
periods, the Index increases by one in the post-restatement period. 
 
Calculation of Index-Change 
 
Index-Pre is calculated in the year preceding the restatement announcement, and Index-Post is calculated two years 
following the restatement. Index-Post / Index-Pre - 1 (Index-Change) is calculated as the percentage change between 
the two. 
 
Index-Change demonstrates the extent of board, audit, and CEO changes implemented by restatement firms. By 
construction, the larger the score, the greater the extent of improvements. 
 
3.  REGRESSION MODEL  
  
A regression model may be used to explore the relation between Index-Change and various restatement and 
firm characteristics thought to influence Index-Change. The expectation is that variation in Index-Change among 
restatement firms can be explained by restatement- and firm-specific characteristics. Broadly speaking, the decision 
to strengthen corporate governance following a restatement is a function of the type and severity of the restatement. 
Formally, this can be summarized by the equation below.  
 
 
                                                 
13 The Big Six existed until Price Waterhouse merged with Coopers and Lybrand in 1998. 
14 See Benston (1985), Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Weisbach (1988), Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988), Gilson (1989), 
Martin and McConnell (1991), Murphy and Zimmerman (1993), Denis and Denis (1995), Kang and Shivdasani (1995), Franks 
and Mayer (1996), Mikkelson and Partch (1997), Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001), Dahya, McConnell, and Travlos (2002), and 
Conyon and Florou (2002). For a review of the literature, see Furtado and Karan (1990).  
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Index-Change = F (test variable, control variables) 
 
 For example, the expectation is that restatements that indicate lack of management integrity will motivate a 
decision to strengthen corporate governance and thus be positively related to Index-Change. As in Palmrose et al. 
(2004), restatements involving fraud are classified based on company disclosures of fraud (irregularities) or issuance 
of an SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER, hereafter). Since fraud represents intentional, 
non-GAAP financial reporting, it suggests lack of management integrity. Therefore, the following might be a 
reasonable hypothesis to test using Index-Change as part of the regression model. 
 
Sample Hypothesis. There is a positive relation between restatements involving fraud and changes to strengthen 
firms’ governance mechanisms in the period following the restatement.  
 
  In addition to the test variable, the following sections discuss several variables included in the model to 
control for firm characteristics that might affect changes in corporate governance. 
 
Pre-Restatement Governance 
 
The restatement firms in the sample have a maximum Index value between 3 and 13 (mean = 10.84; median 
= 11). The governance level in the pre-restatement period is calculated as the fraction represented by the Index 
divided by the maximum Index for that firm-year, less the median governance level in the same industry-year in the 
control sample of non-restatement firms. This measure is used to compare the pre-restatement governance level of 
each restatement firm to the remaining firms in the industry in that particular year. Presumably, the higher the pre-
restatement governance level, the greater the cost and effort needed for a restatement firm to enhance its governance 
mechanisms.
15
 Perhaps, in such a situation, a firm would be less inclined (or able) to expend the necessary 
resources. In addition, as a second control of pre-restatement governance levels, the pre-restatement period of each 
sample restatement is matched to the median governance level in the same industry-year in non-restatement firms. 
This variable is used to control for patterns in governance levels among the various industries. 
 
Firm Industry and Restatement Year  
 
 Industry and restatement year variables are necessary to control for normal changes in corporate 
governance structure that vary by industry and by year. Previous studies have shown that restatements are more 
likely in certain industries, such as manufacturing and technology (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995; Burns and 
Kedia, 2006). In addition, the year of the restatement needs to be considered. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002 imposed a number of regulations that mandated enhanced standards for all U.S. public company boards, 
management, and public accounting firms. Of particular consequence to the calculation of the Index, Section 301 of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act required all listed companies to have audit committees composed entirely of independent 
directors. In addition, the internal controls provisions of Section 404 likely prompted a number of restatements after 
2002. As such, it is decidedly important to control for the effects of both the industry and the year of the restatement. 
 
The median Index-Change over the prior three years is calculated for each industry-year in non-restatement 
firms, where an industry is defined by its 2-digit SIC code. The intuition for this calculation is as follows. Index-
Change corresponds to the change in governance level between the pre-restatement and post-restatement periods. By 
construction, this represents a span of three years. Therefore, to control for “normal” changes in the Index over a 
three-year period, each sample restatement is matched to the median Index-Change for the corresponding industry-
year in non-restatement firms. This control variable is referred to as Index-Change-Control. 
 
4.  SAMPLE SELECTION AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
 The sample consists of 919 financial statement restatements issued by 845 public companies from January 
1, 1997 through June 30, 2002, as identified by the 2002 GAO Report. These restatements were announced to 
                                                 
15 Since governance changes come at a cost to the firm, the benefits need to outweigh the costs. The higher the pre-restatement 
governance level, the more costly improvements become, and the less likely it is that the benefits will outweigh the costs. 
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correct previous material misstatements of financial results. The GAO database excludes announcements involving 
stock splits, changes in accounting principles, and other financial statement restatements that were not made to 
correct mistakes in the application of accounting standards. 
 
The GAO Report supplies some useful data regarding each restatement announcement. For instance, 
restatements are categorized into one or more of nine major categories, such as revenue- and expense-related 
restatements. In addition, the prompter of each restatement (i.e., company, auditor, SEC) is identified. This paper 
further analyzes the restatements and partitions them on the basis of the magnitude of the restatement’s effect on net 
income, the total number of financial periods restated, and the reason for the restatement, thus producing a more 
detailed classification of the restatement firms. These items are identified through a comprehensive search of 
restating firms’ 10-Ks/10-Qs and amended 10-Ks/10-Qs as well as from information provided by the individual 
firms. 
 
The GAO restatement firm database is then merged with Compustat’s Executive Compensation 
(ExecuComp, hereafter) database to ensure that management-related data are available to include in the Index. The 
data are further merged with the database compiled by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC, 
hereafter). IRRC data are taken from publicly-available 1996-2004 proxy statements issued in anticipation of the 
annual meetings for the S&P 1500 companies. The data include characteristics pertaining to the board of directors 
and are thus utilized in the calculation of the Index. 
 
These datasets combine to obtain 254 restatements by 225 unique firms. In order to perform the analysis, 
data must be available in both the pre-restatement and post-restatement periods. Because of this requirement, the 
sample is reduced to 140 restatements. An additional three observations are further eliminated due to missing data 
regarding the restatement duration and magnitude, yielding 137 restatements in the final sample. 
 
Panel A of Table 1 presents a reconciliation of the sample, and Panel B presents the control sample. The 
control sample consists of all non-restatement firms (i.e., non-GAO firms) over the period 1996 – 2004 appearing in 
both the ExecuComp and IRRC databases. Table 1, Panel B provides a distribution of control sample firms across 
the years 1996 – 2004. The number of firms with available data increases slightly each year from 949 in 1996 to 
1,262 in 2004. 
 
Panel A of Table 2 presents the yearly distribution of sample restatements. Although the sample period 
extends from the beginning of 1997 through June 2002, the vast majority of the restatements (71%) are announced 
between the years 1999 and 2001, in part due to the SEC initiatives to restate IPR&D charges and to adopt new 
revenue recognition rules under SAB101, in late 1998 and late 1999, respectively. Table 2, Panel B provides the 
distribution of sample restatements across firms. Because of several cases of multiple restatements by firms, the 137 
sample restatements are issued by 121 unique firms. Multiple restatements by firms are analyzed independently, 
each one presenting its own set of circumstances. Finally, Panel C of Table 2 provides the industry distribution of 
sample restatements. With more than 37% of the restatements, manufacturing is the most frequently occurring 
industry in the sample. Using the same industry classification system, manufacturing is also the industry with the 
greatest number of Compustat firms (32.5%), implying that this finding is consistent. 
 
 Descriptive statistics for sample restatements are presented in Table 3. Based on the GAO Report, Panel A 
itemizes the sample by initiator of the restatement, exchange listing of the restatement firm, and reason for the 
announced restatement. In addition, the sample is classified by the presence or absence of fraud based on company 
admission of misstatement due to fraud/irregularities or based on issuance of an enforcement action (AAER) by the 
SEC. The Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe is searched by restatement firm name for occurrences of AAERs in all 
years subsequent to the announced restatement. The circumstances surrounding each AAER are carefully studied to 
determine whether fraudulent behavior by the firm prompted the SEC action.
16
 
 
                                                 
16 AAERs are generally quite explicit in specifying the targets and causes of the enforcement action. Therefore, based on the 
timeline and stated details of each AAER, it is relatively objective to ascertain whether it was fraudulent behavior by the firm that 
prompted the SEC action. 
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Table 1: Sample Selection and Control Sample 
Panel A: Sample selection of 137 restatements in the period 1997 – June 2002 
Restriction                          Sample Size 
Number of restatements in the period 1997 - June 2002 (GAO database) 
 
Less: 
     
    Firms without data in both the S&P ExecuComp 
    and IRRC (Investor Responsibility Research Center) databases (1996 – 2004) 
 
    Observations without data for the pre- or post-restatement period 
 
    Observations with missing restatement severity data 
 
 
 
 
 
665 
 
114 
 
3 
919 
 
 
 
 
254 
 
140 
 
Final restatement sample  137 
Panel B: Control sample: non-restatement firms 
Year Number of Firms Percentage of Total 
1996 949 8.8% 
1997 1,099 10.2% 
1998 1,202 11.2% 
1999 1,214 11.3% 
2000 1,217 11.3% 
2001 1,284 11.9% 
2002 1,255 11.7% 
2003 1,285 11.9% 
2004 1,262 11.7% 
   
Total 10,767 100% 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Distribution of Sample Restatements by Year, Firm, and Industry 
Panel A: Yearly distribution of restatements 
                          Year 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total 
Number of Observations 7 9 29 26 42 24 137 
Percentage of Total 5% 7% 21% 19% 31% 18% 100%(a) 
(a) The numbers do not sum to 100% due to rounding. 
Panel B: Number of restatements per sample firm 
  Number of Restatements Per Sample Firm l 
 1 2 3 Total 
Number of Firms  106 14 1 121 
Total # of Restatements 106 28 3 137 
Panel C: Industry distribution of sample firms(a) 
                                                                                                             Frequency                              Percentage of Total 
Agriculture, mining, construction 5 3.65% 
Communication 1 0.73% 
Financial services 13 9.49% 
Manufacturing 51 37.23% 
Services 4 2.92% 
Technology 31 22.63% 
Transportation 0 0.00% 
Utilities 9 6.57% 
Wholesale / retail 21 15.33% 
Other 2 1.46% 
Total 137 100% 
(a) Industries are defined by the following SIC codes: Agriculture, mining, and construction = 0 – 1999; Manufacturing = 2000 – 
3999 (except codes assigned to Technology); Technology = 3570 – 3579 plus 7370 – 7379; Transportation = 4000 – 4799; 
Communications = 4800 – 4899; Utilities = 4900 – 4999; Wholesale / retail = 5000 – 5999; Financial services = 6000 – 6999; 
Services = 7000 – 8999 (except codes assigned to Technology). Industry classification is taken from Palmrose and Scholz (2004).  
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 While auditor-initiated restatements account for the smallest portion of the sample (4%), 30% of the 
identified sample restatements are initiated by the company, and 25% are initiated by the SEC. The majority of the 
restatements in the sample are announced by NYSE-listed firms (75.2%), reflecting the fact that the sample 
restatements are made by relatively large companies. Of the total control sample, 66% are NYSE-listed firms, as 
compared to 36.6% of all Compustat firms. This indicates that it is the sample selection that leads to the large-
company bias. Fraud is associated with 28% of the sample restatements. This is roughly comparable to the 21% 
identified by Palmrose et al. (2004) in their restatement sample. Finally, revenue recognition is identified as the 
reason for restatement in 44% of the sample, which is comparable to the findings of the GAO Report.
17
 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Sample Restatements 
Panel A: Restatement characteristics 
                                                                                                           Frequency              Percentage of Total       
             Full Sample                                                                                                                                                                137 100%
  
             Prompter(a)                                                                                           
                   Auditor                 6                                    4% 
                   Company               41                                  30% 
                   SEC               34                                  25% 
                   Other               56                                  41% 
  
             Exchange Listing(a)                                     
                   AMEX                 1                                  0.7% 
                   NASDAQ               33                                24.1% 
                   NYSE             103                                75.2% 
  
             AAER/Fraud(b)                           
                   Yes               39                                  28% 
                   No               98                                  72% 
  
             Reason(a)(c)   
                   Cost or expense               21                                 15% 
                   In-process R&D                 8                                   6% 
                   Loan-loss                 3                                   2% 
                   Mergers and acquisitions               14                                 10% 
                   Reclassification                 6                                   4% 
                   Related-party transactions                 8                                   6% 
                   Restructuring, assets, or inventory               23                                 17% 
                   Revenue recognition               60                                 44% 
                   Securities related                 3                                   2% 
                   Unspecified                 5                                   4% 
                   Other               12                                   9% 
(a) This breakdown is based on the GAO Report (2002). 
(b) AAER/Fraud is defined as in Palmrose et al. (2004) as the issuance of an enforcement action (AAER) by the SEC or company 
disclosures of fraud/irregularities. 
(c) A number of restatements are coded with multiple reasons. Therefore, the percentages listed do not sum to 100%.           
 
 
 Panel B of Table 3 describes the restatements that are identified as revenue-related in further detail. 
Restatements triggered by the SEC adoption of revenue recognition rules under SAB101 and those resulting from 
guidance by a FASB EITF account for equal shares of the sample (32% each). The remainder of the sample (about 
37%) comprises all remaining revenue-related restatements, such as those resulting from improperly recorded or 
overstated sales, understated costs of goods sold and other expenses, and timing of revenue recognition issues. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 The GAO Report identifies revenue recognition as the reason for restatement in 38% of the restatements analyzed. 
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Table 3: Panel B: Revenue recognition restatements 
                                                                                                                 Frequency            Percentage of Total       
             Revenue recognition                                                                                                                                                                                  60                             100%(a)
  
                   SAB101(b)                     19                              32% 
                   EITF(c)                     19                              32% 
                   Other                     22                              37% 
(a) The numbers do not sum to 100% due to rounding. 
(b) SAB101 refers to restatements resulting from the SEC adoption of revenue recognition rules under Staff Accounting Bulletin 
No. 101 (SAB101).  
(c) EITF refers to restatements resulting from guidance by a FASB Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF).  
 
 
 Panel C of Table 3 reports some further descriptive statistics for the sample restatements. The mean 
(median) restatement amount is -$353.6 (-$4.9) million. This is calculated by subtracting originally reported net 
income (in millions) from restated net income (summed over all restated periods). The magnitude of the restatement 
measures the restatement amount as a percentage of the firm’s total assets at the year-end prior to the restatement 
announcement. The mean (median) magnitude for the sample is -2.3% (-0.16%). These numbers are consistent with 
the notion that, on average, it is income-decreasing restatements that are required to correct prior misstatements of 
net income, often due to intentional manipulation. The duration of the restatement, measured as the number of 
quarters restated, has a mean (median) value of 6.3 (4.0). This is similar to findings by Palmrose et al. (2004) and 
Srinivasan (2005), among others. 
 
As in Palmrose et al. (2004), a market-adjusted model based on an equally weighted index (with dividends) 
is used to estimate abnormal returns. This model subtracts the CRSP market index return from a firm’s daily return 
to obtain the market-adjusted abnormal return for each day and firm. The daily abnormal returns are summed to 
calculate the cumulative abnormal return (CAR, hereafter) for a given time period. The mean (median) market-
adjusted CAR, using an equally weighted index over the 2-day window beginning on day 0, the day of the 
restatement announcement, is -5.0% (-2.7%).
18
 This is comparable to results in Agrawal and Chadha (2005) but 
slightly lower than results in Palmrose et al. (2004).
19
 Finally, the panel confirms that the sample firms are relatively 
large. The mean (median) total assets at the year-end prior to the restatement announcement is $9,101 ($2,513) 
million. 
 
 
Table 3: Panel C: Further descriptive statistics 
                                                                                                       Mean             Q1             Median             Q3  
Restatement amount (in $ millions)                    -353.6            -27.0              -4.9                   0 
Magnitude (scaled by total assets)                    -2.3%            -0.8%            -0.16%               0% 
Duration (number of quarters)                     6.3                  3                    4                      8 
Announcement return (0,1)(a)                    -5.0%            -10.1%            -2.7%              1.0% 
Size of  firm (total assets in $ millions)                    9,101              836               2,513              9,536 
(a) The announcement return is defined as the market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return (equally weighted index) over days 0 
and 1, where day 0 is the restatement announcement date. 
 
 
5.  CONSTRUCTION OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE  
 
The dependent variable, Index-Change, is derived through a number of steps from data collected from the 
IRRC, Compustat, and ExecuComp databases. The IRRC database provides information on the board of directors, 
Compustat provides data on audit variables, and ExecuComp provides data on management-related variables. Based 
on the data collection, an Index is calculated for the firm in each sample restatement in the year preceding the 
restatement announcement (pre-restatement period) and then again two years following the restatement (post-
                                                 
18 As in Palmrose et al. (2004), the announcement effect occurs primarily on days 0 and +1. The mean (median) CAR over a 
three-day window beginning one day prior to the restatement announcement (day -1) is -5.0% (-3.3%). 
19 Agrawal and Chadha (2005) report the CAR over a three-day window to have a mean (median) of -5.7% 
 (-2.5%). Palmrose et al. (2004) find the 2-day CAR to have a mean (median) of -9.2% (-4.6%). 
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restatement period). As discussed earlier, the Index is a composite score computed based on an array of governance 
features, including board, audit, and management-related variables. 
 
Table 4 describes the variables included in the Index. Variables 1-10 relate to the board of directors, 
variables 11-12 concern the external auditor, and variable 13 relates to the top management (CEO) of the firm. Table 
5 presents descriptive statistics for the components of the Index. Panel A reports statistics for a reduced control 
sample of 7,517 firm-year observations beginning in 1999. The purpose of the reduced control sample is to facilitate 
comparison with the Index variables of sample restatements in the post-restatement period. For restatements in the 
sample (1997 – 2002), the post-restatement period refers to the years 1999 – 2004. Because statistics are 
undoubtedly linked to the time period, it is imperative to view the post-restatement period of restatement firms with 
regard to a contemporaneous control sample. 
 
Panel B provides summary statistics for the post-restatement period of the 137 sample restatements. A 
comparison between Panels A and B highlights a number of differences between the control and restatement 
samples. In particular, the difference in means is statistically significant for the fraction of independent directors on 
the board as well as various board sub-committees, the size of the board, whether the board chair is an independent 
outside director, and whether there is a change in CEO over the prior three years.
20
 
 
 
Table 4: Description of Index Variables 
   Variable Name                                           Variable Description                    
bd-ind                                                                                                                                                          Fraction of independent directors on the board.
dual-CEO 1 if the CEO is not the board chair; zero, otherwise. 
indep-chair 1 if an independent outside director is the board chair; zero, otherwise. 
audit-indep Fraction of independent directors on the audit committee. 
comp-indep Fraction of independent directors on the compensation committee. 
nom-indep Fraction of independent directors on the nominating committee. 
corpgov-indep Fraction of independent directors on the corporate governance committee. 
bd-size Number of board members. 
interlock Fraction of interlocked directors on the board. 
other-boards Total number of other companies’ boards served by all directors, divided by total number of 
board members. 
auditor-big6 1 if the firm is audited by a Big Six firm; zero, otherwise. 
auditor-switch 1 if there is a change in auditor; zero, otherwise. 
CEO-switch 1 if there is a change in CEO; zero, otherwise. 
Index-Pre 
Index-Post 
Total Index in the pre-restatement period (year t – 1). 
Total Index in the post-restatement period (year t + 2). 
The Index can range from 0 to 13. The Index increases by one if: (1) more than two-thirds of the board is comprised of 
independent directors; (2) the CEO is not also Chairman of the Board; (3) the Chairman of the Board is an independent outside 
director; (4) all audit committee members are independent directors; (5) all compensation committee members are independent 
directors; (6) all nominating committee members are independent directors; (7) all corporate governance committee members 
are independent directors; (8) the board size is less than the median of all firms (adjusted for firm size and time); (9) the board 
interlock is less than the median of all firms (adjusted for firm size and time); (10) the mean number of other boards served by a 
director is less than the median of all firms (adjusted for firm size and time); (11) the firm is audited by a Big Six firm; (12) 
there is a change in the external auditor within the last three years; (13) there is a change in the CEO within the last three years. 
To adjust for firm size and time, the measure is computed net of the median for the particular year and firm size decile.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 Although these statistically significant differences in Index variables are meaningful, it should be noted that additional controls 
for the time period are necessary, since sample restatements are not evenly distributed across the years. In further analyses, these 
additional controls are implemented. 
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Index Variables 
Panel A: Control sample (non-restatement firms): 1999 – 2004(a) 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev.           N 
bd-ind                                                                                                                                                          0.653 0.667 0.100 1.000 0.171 7,451 
dual-CEO 0.341 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.474 7,517 
indep-chair 0.614 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.487 7,517 
audit-indep 0.900 1.000 0.200 1.000 0.175 7,407 
comp-indep 0.908 1.000 0.143 1.000 0.174 7,302 
nom-indep 0.833 0.667 0.167 1.000 0.216 5,420 
corpgov-indep 0.874 1.000 0.200 1.000 0.188 3,671 
bd-size 9.450 9.000 1.000 28.000 2.914 7,451 
interlock 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.034 7,411 
other-boards 0.856 0.700 0.000 2.900 0.891 7,376 
auditor-big6 0.978 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.147 6,896 
auditor-switch 0.223 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.416 6,168 
CEO-switch 0.326 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.469 5,596 
(a) Descriptive statistics are for the 7,517 firm-year control observations over the period 1999 – 2004. Depending on data 
availability, there is some variation in the total number of firm-year observations for each variable. 
 
Panel B: Restatement firms in the post-restatement period(b) 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev.           N 
bd-ind                                                                                                                                                   0.681* 0.714 0.152 0.938 0.175 136 
dual-CEO  0.294 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.457 136 
indep-chair 0.743* 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.439 136 
audit-indep  0.912* 1.000 0.333 1.000 0.154 135 
comp-indep  0.919* 1.000 0.250 1.000 0.159 132 
nom-indep  0.841* 1.000 0.222 1.000 0.215 115 
corpgov-indep 0.875* 1.000 0.222 1.000 0.181 92 
bd-size  10.000* 10.000 5.000 33.000 3.209 136 
Interlock   0.007 0.000 0.000 0.200 0.028 109 
other-boards 0.978 0.905 0.000 2.846 0.640 114 
auditor-big6  0.984 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.124 129 
auditor-switch 0.233 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.424 129 
CEO-switch  0.458* 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.500 131 
* Significant at the 1% level, based on a two-tailed z-test for the difference in means between the post-restatement period for 137 
sample restatements and the control firms during a corresponding time period (1999 – 2004). 
(b) Descriptive statistics are for the 137 sample restatements. Depending on data availability, there is some variation in the total 
number of observations for each variable. 
 
 
As discussed in Section 2, the Index is calculated for the pre- and post-restatement periods for each sample 
restatement by assigning a 0 or 1 to each variable based on specific guidelines. Table 4 reviews the specifications for 
each variable. Although the Index can in theory range from 0 to 13, due to data limitations, the sample firms have a 
maximum Index of anywhere between 3 and 13 (mean = 10.84; median = 11). In cases where the variables available 
for calculation of the Index differ between the pre-restatement and post-restatement periods, only those variables 
that are common to both periods are included in each Index. This eliminates any potential biases regarding data 
availability. The Index Percentage refers to the Index divided by the total number of variables available. Variables 
1-11 can take on a value of either 0 or 1. However, variables 12-13 always have a value of 0 in the pre-restatement 
period and can only vary (between 0 and 1) in the post-restatement period. 
 
As described in Section 2, the dependent variable, Index-Change, refers to the percentage change between 
the Index in the pre-restatement period and the Index in the post-restatement period.
21
 
 
 Table 6 provides some descriptive statistics for the overall Index Percentage in the pre- and post-
restatement periods and then for Index-Change, which represents the change in the Index between the two periods. 
                                                 
21 Because the denominator of the Index Percentage is the same in both the pre- and post-restatement periods, there is no concern 
for the denominator when calculating Index-Change. 
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Panel A compares the Index Percentage among sample restatements in the pre-restatement period (year t – 1) with a 
sample that matches the median Index Percentage in the same industry-year among the control sample of non-
restatement firms to each sample restatement. Sample restatements exhibit lower levels of Index Percentage across 
all quartiles, and the difference in means is statistically significant at the 1% level (0.486 among sample restatements 
versus 0.540 among the control sample). Panel B reports that the Index Percentage among sample restatements in 
the post-restatement period (year t + 2) is higher than the Index Percentage in the pre-restatement period (year t – 1) 
across all quartiles. Furthermore, with a mean Index Percentage of 0.580 in year t + 2 and 0.486 in year t – 1, the 
difference in means between the two periods is statistically significant (t-stat = -5.08; p < .0001). 
 
 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for Index Percentage, Index-Change, and Index-Change-Control 
Panel A: Index Percentage in year t – 1  
                                                                                                                Index Percentage 
                                                                                                     Mean           Q1        Median           Q3  
Restatement Firms (Sample)                    .486           .375          .500             .583 
Non-restatement Firms (Control)                    .540           .500          .545             .600 
(t-stat)                  (-3.75)* 
N                    137 
* Significant at the 1% level, based on a two-tailed t-test for the difference in means between the Index Percentage among 
sample restatements in the pre-restatement period and a sample of the matched median Index Percentage values in the same 
industry-year in non-restatement firms (control sample). 
Panel B: Index Percentage in years t – 1 and t + 2 
                                                                                                                 Index Percentage 
Year Relative to the Restatement                                              Mean          Q1        Median           Q3  
Pre-restatement (t – 1)                     .486           .375          .500             .583 
Post-restatement (t + 2)                     .580           .455          .583             .667 
(t-stat)                   (-5.08)* 
N                     137 
* Significant at the 1% level, based on a two-tailed t-test for the difference in means between years t – 1 and t + 2. 
 
 
As discussed in Section 3, Index-Change-Control is used to control for “normal” changes in the Index over 
a three-year period. Each sample restatement is matched to the median Index-Change for the corresponding 
industry-year in non-restatement firms (control sample).
22
 Panel C of Table 6 compares statistics between Index-
Change and Index-Change-Control. The difference in mean values between the two variables is statistically 
significant (t-stat = 3.72; p < .0001). The implication is that changes to the Index appear to be more pronounced 
among sample restatement firms than in the control sample of non-restatement firms. 
 
 
Table 6: Panel C: Index-Change and Index-Change-Control 
                                                                                                      Mean          Q1         Median           Q3  
Index-Change                    .331           .000          .167             .500 
Index-Change-Control                    .120           .043          .100             .143 
(t-stat)                   (3.72)* 
N                     137 
* Significant at the 1% level, based on a two-tailed t-test for the difference in means between Index-Change and Index-Change-
Control. 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 The calculation of the Index in non-restatement firms is similar to the calculation in sample firms, with the following 
exceptions: (1) all available data are used for the calculation each year; (2) all variables can take on values of either 0 or 1 in any 
given year. To calculate Index-Change in non-restatement firms, the following method is employed. For each firm-year, the 
Index is divided by the total number of variables available. This creates an Index Percentage and allows for changes in data 
availability. For each firm-year, Index-Change is then calculated as the percentage change in the Index Percentage over the prior 
three years. 
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6.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR A SAMPLE HYPOTHESIS 
 
 Table 7 defines the variables as they are used in the analysis that follows. The dependent variable, sample 
test variable, and control variables are described in the table.  
 
 
Table 7: Variable Definitions 
Dependent Variable:  
Index-Change                                                                                                                                                     Index-Post / Index-Pre - 1 
Sample Test Variable:  
AAER 1 if the SEC issued an enforcement action (Accounting and Auditing Enforcement 
Release) or the company admitted that the misstatement was due to fraud/irregularities; 
zero, otherwise. 
Control Variables:  
Pre The governance level in the pre-restatement period, calculated as the fraction represented 
by the Index divided by the maximum Index for that firm-year, less the median 
governance level in the same industry-year in non-restatement firms (control sample). 
Gov-Control The median governance level in the pre-restatement period in the same industry-year in 
non-restatement firms (control sample). 
Index-Change-Control 
 
The median Index-Change over the prior three years in the same industry-year in non-
restatement firms (control sample), where an industry is defined by its 2-digit SIC code. 
 
 
 Table 8 presents cross-sectional results for the following equation:  
 
  Index-Change   =      β0 + β1 Pre + β2 Gov-Control  
 + β3 Index-Change-Control + β4 AAER + ε 
    
 
This equation is based on the theoretical model and sample hypothesis developed in Section 3. The generalized form 
of this model follows: 
 
Index-Change   =      β0 + β1 Pre + β2 Gov-Control  
 + β3 Index-Change-Control + β4 X + ε 
     
 
where X refers to any test variable (i.e. restatement or firm characteristic) predicted to explain Index-Change in a 
specific way. Pre and Gov-Control are control variables included in the model to control for pre-restatement 
governance levels. Index-Change-Control is included in the model as well because of its importance in controlling 
for industry and year effects. To control for the “normal” changes in the Index over a three-year period, Index-
Change-Control matches each sample restatement with the median Index-Change for the corresponding industry-
year in non-restatement firms.  
 
Table 8: Regression Results 
Index-Change on AAER 
Independent Variables Expected Sign Coefficient          t-statistic 
Intercept  2.410 (5.07)
*** 
Pre - - 2.719 (-9.70)
*** 
Gov-Control - - 4.206 (-5.21)
*** 
Index-Change-Control + - 0.183 (-0.41) 
AAER + 0.230 (2.53)
** 
    
Model Statistics    
N  137  
Adjusted R2  47%  
F-statistic  30.78
*** 
 
**, *** Significant at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Results in Table 8 show that as predicted by the Sample Hypothesis, the coefficient of AAER is significant 
at the 5% level in explaining changes to firms’ governance mechanisms in the post-restatement period. Firms are 
more likely to implement corporate governance changes following restatements involving fraud. Coefficients of Pre 
and Gov-Control are highly significant at the 1% level, and the model’s adjusted R2 is 47%. 
 
7.  CONCLUSIONS  
 
This paper conducts an analysis on a sample of 137 restatements issued by 121 unique U.S. firms over the 
period January 1997 through June 2002. It provides a detailed classification of the sample on the basis of presence 
of fraud, prompter, magnitude, severity, and reason for the restatement. It develops the Index, an innovative research 
tool designed to investigate whether a correlation exists between restatement characteristics and steps taken by firms 
to improve their governance mechanisms in the period following a restatement. This Index, calculated as a 
composite score based on an array of governance features, including board, audit, and management-related variables 
measures the joint strength of multiple corporate governance attributes within a firm. The Index is calculated for 
each firm in the year preceding the restatement announcement and then again two years following the restatement. 
The paper demonstrates how a comparison of the Index between the two periods may be used to relate the nature 
and magnitude of a restatement with the likelihood of corporate governance changes in the aftermath of restatement. 
 
To illustrate the use of the Index in the research model, a sample hypothesis is examined. As expected, 
results show a statistically significant association between restatements involving fraud and changes aimed to 
strengthen firms’ governance structures following the restatements.  
 
 In view of the prevalence of earnings restatements in recent years, this study is both timely and important. 
While consequences to restatement firms can be quite severe, governance changes do not necessarily follow 
restatements. It is possible that entrenched and/or overconfident managers may choose not to undertake 
improvements. Also, relatively more technical restatements, such as those that arise in response to official guidance, 
may be less likely to provide incentive to restatement firms to implement changes. 
 
This study contributes to the literature in two major ways. First, the more detailed classification of GAO 
restatements sets the stage for further analysis by recognizing that responses to restatements likely relate to 
particular characteristics of the restatement. Second, the paper develops a research model designed to relate the 
nature and magnitude of a restatement with the likelihood of corporate governance changes in the post-restatement 
period. 
 
Future research is needed to use the methodology outlined in this paper to conduct further tests and 
determine additional results of restatements. This would have definite implications for investors as well as 
regulators. For example, investors can be comforted by the finding that restatements involving financial statement 
fraud “force” firms to correct underlying problems by implementing changes in their governance arrangements. 
Under such circumstances, firms appear to understand the value in strengthening their corporate governance. 
Similarly, further findings are necessary to ascertain which restatement characteristics are associated with 
governance improvements. Where restatements are found less likely to effect governance changes, regulation may 
be beneficial. On the other hand, it would be prudent for regulators to consider the nature and magnitude of the 
restatement. For instance, intervention may seem unnecessary in cases of relatively more technical restatements, 
such as those that arise due to official guidance, or those that are relatively less severe in terms of their effect on 
firms’ financial statements.  
 
 This study has implications for several other lines of future research. First, future research may look to 
address alternative formulations of the Index. For instance, the inclusion of other governance variables would add to 
the robustness of the Index as a measure for the overall strength of a firm’s corporate governance. Furthermore, 
weighting component features of the Index using a systematic method might yield added insight regarding firms’ 
decisions to implement changes to their governance mechanisms.  
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